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Abstract
A subsidized savings accounts program is being considered by USDA’s Risk Management
Agency to provide an income safety net to farmers.  We argue that savings accounts would
complement federal crop insurance program and other private risk management strategies that
farmers routinely adopt to minimize income risk and hence offer a better safety net.
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Farm Safety Net:  Subsidized Savings Accounts for U.S. Farmers
Shiva S. Makki, Agapi Somwaru, and Thomas Worth
Low commodity prices, variable farm incomes, and the declining number of farms in recent years
have brought the issue of safety net back into policy discussion.  A subsidized savings accounts
program is being considered by USDA’s Risk Management Agency (RMA) to complement other
publicly supported risk management programs and to provide an income safety net to farmers. 
Subsidized savings accounts would enable farmers to build a cash reserve and manage their
income flows.  By depositing income into accounts during years of high net farm income,
farmers could build a fund to draw on during years of low income.  There are several ways in
which government can subsidize a savings account.  The major ones that are being discussed
include tax deferrals, bonus interest rates, and government matching.  Savings accounts, as a
safety net program, would be beneficial to farmers for reducing income risks by cross subsidizing
the bad years with the good years’ returns.  The subsidized savings accounts would add to the
array of publicly supported risk management and safety net programs that are available to
farmers.  The purpose of this paper is to assess whether a subsidized savings accounts program
can provide a farm income safety net in the presence of crop insurance and other market-based
risk management tools.
This paper is organized as follows.  First, we discuss the meaning of ‘farm safety net’, the
kinds of risks that farmers face, and the strategies they use to minimize those risks.  Second, we
discuss the role of savings in mitigating income risk, and the relationship between savings and
other risk management strategies.  Third, we review the current subsidized savings programs and3
discuss their potential to provide a farm safety net.
1.  What is Farm Safety Net?
Many in the agricultural community have identified the need to provide a flexible safety net for
supporting producer income in times of adverse economic conditions.  However, there is no
consensus on what constitutes a ‘safety net’ or how to achieve it.  For economists, a safety net is
a policy that ensures a minimum income, consumption, or wage level, which would provide
farmers protection against production and market risks (Gundersen, et al., 2000).  In a recent
Farm Foundation Report on the 2002 Farm Bill, a farm safety net is defined as a public policy to
assure farmers of at least minimal economic security in the face of uncertain markets and forces
of nature (Tweeten, 2002).  For political decision makers, on the other hand, the safety net
concept may imply safeguarding average income on the farm.
A farm safety net policy can be comprised of one or more public programs directed at
supporting commodity price, yields, revenue, or whole farm gross or net income.  Such programs
as crop yield or revenue insurance, whole-farm insurance, direct payments, price supports,
disaster assistance, stock accumulation, export subsidies, and the conservation reserve program
are often used to provide a safety net to farmers.
Farming is an inherently risky business.  Farmers face numerous risks in agriculture,
including production risk, price or market risk, institutional risk, human or personal risk, and
financial risk (Harwood et al., 1997).  Up until the 1996 farm bill, commodity support programs
provided direct payments to participating farmers when market prices fell below a target price set
by the government.  The 1996 farm bill reduced the government's intervention in agricultural4
markets and shifted the focus toward greater emphasis on market-based policies.  This
fundamental change shifted a greater portion of the risk from the government to the producer.
Farmers adopt a portfolio of strategies to manage production, price, and income risks. 
Responses to farm risk often involve market insurance and self-insurance.  Market insurance
includes several intra-year risk management tools such as crop yield and revenue insurance,
whole farm insurance, futures and options contracts, and contract sales.  Self-insurance, on the
other hand, includes inter-year risk management tools such as inter-temporal savings,
borrowings, and consumption substitution possibilities.  These tools, used separately or in
combination, provide farmers with a measure of protection from uncertain prices and yield.  In
this paper, however, we focus on inter-year savings as a tool to smooth farm income, assuming
all other intra-year risk management options are also available to farmers.
2.  Savings as a Safety Net
Savings and borrowing are ways to mitigate consumption and income risks.  In an economy with
well developed capital markets, farmers’ ability to save and borrow is a significant factor in
reducing income risk.  For example, studies have shown that individuals manage their savings
and investment to minimize the adverse effects of variable income (Deaton 1991 and 1992).  The
1999 USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Study (ARMS) survey indicates that 35
percent of farm families participated in tax-deferred retirement savings plans (Mishra and
Morehart, 2002).
Savings are desirable for several reasons: First, savings can generate a positive return. 
Second, savings guard against unexpected income shocks.  Third, savings can be used to5
purchase farm equipment and machines.  Fourth, savings can be used to maintain a certain
standard of living even through retirement.  Farm households are vulnerable to various risks and
savings can be used to complement other risk mitigating strategies.  However, the objectives of
insurance and savings could be conflicting in the short-run because protecting against large crop
losses may involve hefty premium costs which would reduce the funds available for savings
(Gollier 1994).
Farmers often have difficulty maintaining a reserve of cash from one year to the next.  In
years of good farm income, farmers make capital investments to improve the production process
and also to reduce taxes.  During bad years, cash flow often becomes an issue.  Continued large
government outlays for disaster assistance and other commodity programs are viewed by some as
providing a disincentive to save (see Mishra and Morehart, 2002).  Policies that create incentives
to self-insure or save in order to stabilize income are being considered.  Several savings account
programs have been proposed that allow farmers to save during “good years” and draw on the
reserves in “bad years”.  These programs could help farm operators manage their year-to-year
income variability.  Subsidized savings accounts could provide an alternative for farmers who
might otherwise not save enough.
The paper by Mishra and Morehart (2002) offers two valuable insights for developing
subsidized savings accounts.  First, farm households have their money invested in a diversified
portfolio, including savings.  This would suggest that programs with incentives to save more for
“rainy days” may attract more farmers.  Second, the results of the study, which are based on
USDA’s ARMS survey, show that farm households that received government payments saved
less on average than those who did not receive government payments.  Authors contend that6
government payments become a substitute for savings, or that participation in government
programs decreases the amount of perceived risk.  Also, farm households that bought business
insurance have on average a lower propensity to save compared with the uninsured.    On the
other hand, the study finds that farm households that purchased business insurance save more for
unexpected income shocks.  This suggests complex interaction among different risk management
tools that needs to be considered while designing and implementing a savings account program.
Even though subsidized savings accounts will likely increase savings, the effectiveness of
the additional savings in smoothing income would depend on its impact on farmers’ use of other
risk management tools.  The incentive structure of a savings account would determine if savings
account program complement or substitute for the existing safety net programs.  For example, an
incentive structure that requires savings accounts be exhausted before crop insurance indemnity
payments are made would reduce participation in crop insurance and may also reduce the amount
available for saving.
Makki and Miranda (2000) examined optimal farm income risk management in a multi-
year stochastic framework.  In their prototype model, a typical farm household has the option to
either self insure through savings, or to purchase market insurance, either a yield/revenue
insurance contract or an options/futures contract, to reduce income risk.  The study analyzes the
potential tradeoffs and complementarities that exist between self-insurance strategies involving
savings and borrowing and market insurance.  Several findings of this study have implications
for subsidized savings accounts and are summarized below.
First, the choices of self-insurance and market insurance contracts are interrelated and
applied simultaneously.  These two alternative means of reducing farming risk are both7
substitutes and complements.  From the view point of resource allocation, they are substitutes
because they compete for the same resources.  From the point of view of reducing overall risk, on
the other hand, they complement each other because each strategy by itself cannot eliminate all
risks.  Since farmers use a multitude of strategies to cope with risk, all risk management options
available to farm households should be considered while designing and implementing risk
management and safety net policies.
Second, the study suggests that farm households weigh the options of either self insuring
through savings or by purchasing market insurance against the risk of loss and cost of reducing
that risk.  The amount of self-insurance and the willingness to pay for market insurance are
sensitive to price and yield variance, interest rates, and the degree of risk aversion.  Public safety-
net policy should aim to improve savings opportunities for farm households and lower the
transactions costs of market insurance.
Finally, simulation results indicate that farmers’ willingness to pay for market insurance
decreases with the level of wealth, while the ability to pay for self-insurance increases with the
level of wealth.  The size of operation permits larger farmers to pursue private risk management
options including savings.  Smaller farmers, on the other hand, may not have enough net income
to accumulate savings.
Small farmers receive relatively little from the current set of commodity programs
(Gundersen, et al., 2000).  In 1999, small farms, which account for 76 percent of farms
nationwide with gross sales of $50,000 or less, received only 14 percent of the payments, while
large farms, which account for 7 percent of farms nationwide with gross sales of $250,000 or
more, received nearly half of the farm payments (GAO, 2001).  Also, farms specializing in cash8
grains and/or oilseeds (account for 20 percent of all farms) received over 60 percent of
government payments in 1998 (ERS Briefing Room).  Given the heterogeneity of the U.S.
agriculture, it may be necessary to design and implement a safety net program that is more
equitable and would support limited resource farmers (Kuhn and Offutt, 1999).  In addition, the
commodity program benefits are determined annually and change periodically as a result of
policy decisions.  Savings account could be used to reach small and limited resource farmers, as
well as dairy, livestock, and specialty crop producers.  Savings account would be a valuable tool
in addressing income risk management and safety net in a multi-year framework.
3.  Subsidized Savings Accounts
In this section, we examine possible programs for promoting savings and analyze whether the
programs would offer a safety net to farmers.  In particular, we examine two savings accounts
programs that have been discussed as possible additions to the risk management programs.  They
are the Canadian Net Income Stabilization Account (NISA) and the Farm and Ranch Risk
Management Account (FARRM).  The Canadian NISA is the only program that has been in
operation for several years and may offer some lessons for the proposed savings accounts
program in the United States.
Net Income Stabilization Account
In order to understand the potential role of federally subsidized savings accounts, we first turn to
the Canadian NISA program.  The NISA program is designed to help farmers achieve long term
income stability on an individual basis.  NISA, which is a voluntary program, has been operating
since 1991.  In addition to NISA, Canadian farmers have access to other risk management tools9
including crop insurance.
NISA is part of Canada’s farm safety net framework, designed to provide individual level
assistance to achieve income stabilization of farmers, irrespective of the commodities they
produce.  The NISA program subsidizes producers who build savings accounts in high revenue
years, by matching producers’ contributions up to a preset limit.  In years of low income,
producers are allowed to draw from their savings accounts.  NISA operates using two funds: 
Fund 1 holds all the deposits made by the farmers and Fund 2 holds the government matching
contributions and all accumulated interest on both funds.
Under the NISA program, participating farmers contribute up to 3 percent of each year’s
eligible net sales (ENS), and contributions are matched dollar for dollar by the government. 
Farmers are also allowed to make additional non-matched contributions of up to 20 percent of
ENS each year.  The maximum sales eligible for matching is limited to C$250,000 per year per
farming entity.  Qualifying commodities include all primary agricultural commodities except
dairy, poultry, and eggs, which are covered by separate income support programs.  Farmers are
allowed to accumulate a maximum of 150 percent of the previous 5-year average of eligible
sales.  Farmers’ contributions are taxed the year they are deposited, while government
contributions are taxed when they are withdrawn.  Accounts earn market interest rates.  In
addition, farmers’ contributions receive an additional 3 percent annual return from the
government.
Withdrawals from the account are allowed when net farm income falls below the average
of the last 5 years or below a minimum household income level.  Annual withdrawals are limited
to an amount necessary to equate current-year farm income with the previous 5-year average, or10
equate the current year’s income with the minimum household income threshold, which is set at
C$20,000 per individual or C$35,000 per family.  A farmer who retires or wishes to discontinue
participation in the program may withdraw the entire balance, including government
contributions.
In 1999, over 80 percent of Canadian farmers participated in the NISA program.  Since
the inception of the NISA program, participants have deposited more than C$2.6 billion in their
NISA accounts, while governments have made deposits of more than C$2.9 billion (Table 1). 
Participants withdrew a total of C$3.1 billion from funds 1 and 2 since the first year of NISA. 
This left a total of C$3.0 billion in NISA accounts in 1999 (Table 1).
In 1998, there were approximately 142,500 active participants in the NISA program, with
a total of C$3.09 billion held in accounts.  During that year, 97,839 producers were eligible for
withdrawals totaling C$1.5 billion.  Of this number, 52, 899 (54 percent) producers withdrew a
total of C$700 million (44 percent) from their NISA accounts.  An analysis of the withdrawal
patterns shows that a considerable number of NISA participants are choosing not to access their
accounts, even when they experienced lower incomes.  One in eight participants either chose not
to access their accounts or accessed their accounts only once in 6 years, although funds were
available for withdrawal in each year.
Analysis of the 1998 data also shows that nearly 40 percent of NISA participants have
account balances that make up less than 30 percent of their average five year margin.  A majority
of these participants have taken withdrawals in almost all years in which they have participated
in the program.  Many with limited income opportunities from both farm and off-farm sources,
use NISA withdrawals as a form of income supplement.  For these participants, the NISA funds11
never accumulate enough to effectively serve as an income stabilization mechanism.
Coble (1995) analyzed the potential effects of a Canadian-style income stabilization
program for a representative 500-acre farm in Iowa.  The study simulates two alternative NISA
scenarios over a 30 year period.  In the first scenario, the farmer contributes 2 percent of eligible
sales annually, plus any net revenue in excess of 140 percent of the last 5-year average net
revenue. In the second scenario, the farmers’ contribution is limited to the government matching
level of 2 percent of eligible sales.  In both scenarios, contributions occur only in years of
positive income.  The simulation exercise offers several interesting results.  In scenario one, for
example, the farmer contributes more than twice as much to the NISA account as in scenario
two.  The simulated results also indicate that the variation in annul income is reduced by 44 and
21 percent, respectively, under the high and low contribution scenarios.  The study shows that the
probability of NISA accounts being drawn down to zero in any one year, leaving the farmer with
no risk protection, was 20 percent in scenario one and 31 percent in scenario two.
The simulation results indicate that little risk protection is provided to farmers in early years
of participation, because of smaller account balances.  As the number of participation years
increases, there would be larger account balances and, therefore, greater risk protection to
farmers.  Another important finding of this study is that NISA type programs would cost less per
acre than the deficiency payments program.  The simulation results show that for a representative
farm in Iowa, cost per acre of a NISA-type program would have been $2.91 during 1991 through
1994 period.  This compares with an average per acre deficiency payment of $47.46 and $23.73
for corn and soybeans, respectively, during the same period. 
The advantages of NISA include income risk protection and coverage of a wide range of12
farming activities with little or no market distortion.  The NISA program covers net farm income
and hence all crops and livestock are included.
The Canadian NISA program, however, has not achieved its intended objectives.  Some
reviews of the program indicate that farmers have not taken full advantage of the risk protection
potential of the NISA program.  For example, farmers in Canada are unwilling to withdraw from
the NISA accounts even when their income falls.  In recent years, shortfalls in farm revenues
triggered withdrawals from the NISA accounts, but less than half of eligible farmers withdrew
funds.  The program offers incentives to build up savings but not to use it as an income
stabilization tool in times of low farm revenues.  In a survey of Canadian farmers on the role of
NISA program, nearly two-thirds of farmers agreed that NISA is means to save for retirement
(Economic and Policy Analysis Directorate, 2000).
Some of the criticisms of the NISA program are that a producer with no income to
accumulate in an account receives no help, and that a producer’s fund may be exhausted quickly
in case of several successive bad years.  The program is also criticized for being misused for
retirement savings rather than as an income safety net program.
Farm and Ranch Risk Management Account
The proposed Farm and Ranch Risk Management (FARRM) account program would subsidize
farm and ranch operators to build a cash reserve to be available as a safety net.  By depositing
income into accounts during years of high net farm income, farmers could build a fund to draw
on during low income years.  Federal income taxes on eligible contributions would be deferred
until withdrawal.  Under this program, farmers would take a Federal income tax deduction for
deposits of no more than 20 percent of eligible net farm income.  Deposits would be made into13
interest bearing accounts at approved financial institutions, and interest earnings would be
distributed and taxable to the farmer annually.  Withdrawals from principal would be at the
farmer’s discretion (no price or income triggers for withdrawal), and taxable in the year
withdrawn.  Deposits could stay in the account for up to 5 years, with new amounts added on a
first-in first-out basis.  Deposits not withdrawn after 5 years would incur a 10% penalty.
Monke and Durst (1999) examined the feasibility of FARRM accounts as a potential risk
management tool.  Using 1994 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) data, they estimate that nearly a
million farmers would be eligible to contribute as much as $2.8 billion to FARRM accounts each
year.  Farm sole proprietors account for over two-thirds of eligible participants and three-fourths
of potential contributions.  IRS data also indicate that about 80 percent of all farmers could
contribute less than $1,000.  If the eligibility for contributions is based on positive net farm
income, then much of the benefit of FARRM accounts would go to operators of large farms. The
five year window for building reserves combined with generally low level of net farm income
may limit the likelihood of farmers accumulating adequate reserves to self-insure against income
risk.
FARRM accounts are unlikely to affect farmers’ decisions on acreage allocations or on
levels of inputs and, therefore, are not market distorting.  This program is simple and relatively
inexpensive to the government.  Another advantage is that FARRM accounts would be available
to all farmers, even those for whom insurance is not available currently such as livestock, dairy,
poultry, and fishery farmers.  Tax deferred savings plans might be attractive to farmers who use
self-insurance to manage risks.  The major weaknesses of the FARRM program is the time
required to build-up the account.  A producer who is poor, has participated in the program only a14
few years, or who incurs several low revenue years in a row may receive little or no risk
protection from the program.
4.  Will the subsidized savings accounts offer much needed safety net to farmers?
Subsidized savings accounts would likely play a significant role in farm risk management. 
Savings accounts would enable farm households to spread the effects of income shocks across
time, thereby offering an attractive alternative to the use of standard harvest-time price and yield
risk contracts.  The savings accounts would complement federal crop insurance program and
other private risk management strategies that farmers routinely adopt to minimize yield, price,
and/or income risks.  Savings accounts would become more attractive relative to crop insurance
if the government were to match the producer contribution, provide bonus interest rates, and
offer tax concessions.
Savings incentives could help farmers manage risks and create a self-insurance safety net.
However, the level of safety net may depend on the farmers’ ability to accumulate reserves in the
account.  The experience of NISA also suggests that a subsidized savings accounts would
provide greatest benefits to economically successful large commercial farmers who would be
able to build cash reserves, while limited resource farmers may not be able to build safety net
reserves.
Subsidized savings accounts could offer a safety net to farmers in a non-trade distorting
manner.  The cost of such a program may be less than the current set of commodity programs in
offering comparable income stabilization.
Farmers already use savings and borrowing to stabilize income and expenditures, without15
subsidies and tax advantages.  Farmers are likely to participate in a subsidized savings accounts
program to take advantage of the benefits (tax deferrals, bonus interest rates, and/or government
matching contributions).  Both NISA and FARRM programs need modifications before they are
successfully implemented in the U.S.  Whether the program is utilized as a farm safety net or as a
retirement fund depends on the incentive structures and rules for withdrawals.
The Economic Research Service (ERS) is currently involved in conducting research that
will assist the RMA to determine the feasibility and potential effects of subsidized individual
savings accounts to producers.  ERS is analyzing producer eligibility, contributions, and
government costs of various subsidized savings account structures.  Research is also conducted
on Canada’s experience with the subsidized NISA program, including the relationship of NISA
to other economic safety net programs and the relevance of the program to United States
producers.  The ERS research on the NISA program includes access and compilation of the
Canadian NISA program database, analysis of the structure and performance of the program, and
a formal econometric analysis of farmers response to the program.  Furthermore, the research
will identify ways to improve the effectiveness of a NISA-type program in the U.S. within the
context of existing risk management and other safety net programs16
Table 1--Net Income Stabilization (NISA) Program:  Summary of financial statistics for the











1990 200 408  172  378  59 
1991 163 218  57  132  262 
1992 169 131  57  80  443 
1993 173 149  40  62  699 
1994 298 305  52  87  1,218 
1995 405 444  68  118  1,949 
1996 341 314  84  150  2,461 
1997 369 349  166  313  2,838 
1998 370 440  237  470  3,094 
1999 205 187  203  343  3,071 
2000
c 245 3,525 
Total (1990-99) 2,692 2,944 1,135 2,131 3,071
a.  Fund 1 holds all the deposits made by the farmers;
b.  Fund 2 holds the government matching contributions and all accumulated interest on both funds;
c.  Data for year 2000 is preliminary and incomplete.
Source:  NISA Review Consultation Document, 2001.17
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